We develop a public-key cryptosystem based on invariants of diagonalizable groups and investigate properties of such a cryptosystem first over finite fields, then over number fields and finally over finite rings. We consider the security of these cryptosystem and show that it is necessary to restrict the set of parameters of the system to prevent various attacks (including linear algebra attacks and attacks based on the Euclidean algorithm).
Introduction
A new idea for a public-key cryptosystem based on the invariant theory was proposed by Grigoriev in [11] . His original idea was later developed in the paper [12] . The last paragraph of the paper [11] reads as follows:
"The current state of the art in cryptography does not allow one to prove the security of cryptosystems; this is usually a question of belief in the difficulty of a relevant problem and a matter of experience (that is why it is not quite unusual to have a paper on cryptography without theorems, for example, this paper). Quite the opposite, one can expect a 'disappointing' breaking of a particular cryptosystem. This can happen for any of the aforementioned examples (without solving the graph isomorphism problem, see the discussion above). On the other hand, such breaking could lead to interesting algorithms in the theory of group representations. Thus one can treat the above examples (and the general construction as a whole) just as a suggestion to play with cryptosystems based on the invariant theory."
The purpose of our paper is to develop a public-key cryptosystem based on invariants of diagonalizable groups. We go beyond the philosophy of the preceding quote and design a concrete public-key cryptosystem, present an algorithm for its implementation and discuss possible attacks on systems based on invariants of certain groups.
At first we consider these cryptosystems over finite fields F, then we investigate cryptosystems over fields of characteristic zero (in particular, over number fields), and finally we work with cryptosystems over finite rings (in particular, residue classes of rings of integers of number fields modulo their ideals). Each part is distinguished by distinctive properties. For example, cyclicity of the multiplicative group F × plays the most important role over finite fields, the theory of divisors and factorization properties are most important for the number fields, and both properties are important when we work over finite rings. One property that remains valid in all cases is that if G not cyclic then it produces more complicated (and secure) cryptosystems.
Finding an invariant of the group G is trivial in the finite field case. What is challenging is to find an invariant separating vectors from the given set M. We exhibit a simple example for which the security of the cryptosystem is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. Over number fields, the main problem is to find an invariant of G and the problem of the separation of elements of M can be neglected. The cryptosystems over finite rings combine features of the previous two cases and further investigation of their properties are necessary.
Finally, our work leads to an investigation of interesting mathematical problems related to the security of invariant-based cryptosystems. Theoretical results about related mathematical concepts such as minimal degrees of invariants and invariants of supergroups will appear in a separate paper [18] .
Invariants of finitely-generated linear groups
In this paper, we will consider only finitely generated groups G acting faithfully on a finite-dimensional vector space V = F n over a field F of arbitrary characteristic. Therefore, we can assume that G ⊂ GL(V). From the very beginning, assume that the representation ρ : G → GL(V) is fixed, and the group G is given by a finite set of generators. With respect to the standard basis of V, each element g of G is therefore represented by an invertible matrix of size n × n, and g acts on vectors in V by matrix multiplication.
Let
. . , x n ] be the algebra of polynomial functions on GL(V). Then G acts on F[V] via gf(v) = f(g − v), where g ∈ G, f ∈ F[V] and v ∈ V. An invariant f of G is a polynomial f ∈ F[V]
which has the property that its values are the same on orbits of the group G. In other words, for every vector v ∈ V and for every element g ∈ G, we have f(gv) = f(v). We note that different representations of G lead to different invariants in general, but this is not going to be a problem for us since our representation of G is fixed. We denote the algebra of invariants of G by F[V] G .
Public key-cryptosystem based on invariants
We start by recalling the original idea of the public-key cryptosystem based on invariants [11] and its modification presented in [12] .
Design of cryptosystems based on invariants of groups
To design a cryptosystem, Alice needs to choose a finitely generated subgroup G of GL(V), for some vector space V = F n and a set {g , . . . , g t } of generators of G. Alice needs to know a polynomial invariant f : v → f(v) of this representation of G. She also chooses an invertible n × n matrix a. Then the polynomial af : v → f(av) is an invariant of the conjugate group a − Ga.
Depending on the choice f and a, Alice chooses a set M = {v , . . . , v s− } of messages consisting of vectors from V that are separated by the polynomial af , i.e. f(av i ) ̸ = f(av j ) whenever i ̸ = j. Alice also chooses a set of randomly generated elements g , . . . , g m of G (say, by multiplying some of the given generators of G), which generates a subgroup G ὔ of G.
Alice announces as a public key the set M of possible messages, and the group H = a − G ὔ a, conjugated to G ὔ .
In the first paper [11] , the author assumes that the group G, its representation in GL(V) and the invariant f are included in the public key. We refer to this setup as variant one. In the second paper [12] , however, the authors assume that the representation of G in GL(V) and the invariant f are secret. We refer to this setup as variant two. We will discuss both variants later.
For the encryption, every time Bob wants to transmit a message v i ∈ M, he chooses a randomly generated element h of the group H (by multiplying some of the generators of H given as a public key). Then he computes u = hv i and transmits the vector u ∈ V to Alice.
To decrypt the message, Alice first computes au and then applies the invariant f . (Of course, this is the same as an application of the invariant af of H that separates elements of M):
Since a was chosen so that f(av i ) ̸ = f(av j ) whenever i ̸ = j, Alice now readily determines the contents of the message (v i ) sent by Bob from the value of f(au).
Let us discuss briefly the choices of n, F, G and M. It appears that choosing large n is better for the security of the cryptosystem, but it also increases the expansion in size from plaintext to ciphertext by the factor n.
The bigger and more complicated the structure of F, the more secure is the cryptosystem; complicated structure of G, particularly if G is not cyclic, also increases security.
Finally, we should choose the set M as large as possible for two reasons. The first reason is that larger set M shrinks the number of invariants of G that separate elements of M, and thus increases the security of the cryptosystem. The second reason is that larger set M decreases the ratio of the expansion in size from plaintext to ciphertext during the encryption.
Previously analyzed attacks on the cryptosystem based on invariants of groups
Let us note it is important that during the encryption process, Bob uses all generators h i to scramble the message. If some generators were not involved, then to decode Bob's message, it would suffice to find an invariant of a proper subgroup of H, which is an easier task.
The attacks described below are considered in [11] and [12] for the case |M| = . We are providing their description for the convenience of the reader and for further clarification. We adapt them to the case when |M| = s.
To break the encryption, it is enough for Charlie to find any invariant f ὔ of the group H that separates elements of M. If s > , then we can replace this by a weaker condition. Namely, it is enough to find
If there is a unique vector v i such that f ὔ (u) = f(v i ), then the message corresponding to v i was sent by Bob.
Variant one
Consider variant one of the cryptosystem -that is, the group G, its representation in GL(V) and an invariant f are known. We can assume that f is a homogeneous polynomial of degree d. In this case, it is known that there is a homogeneous invariant f ὔ of H of degree d that is of the form f ὔ (v) = f(bv) for some matrix b ∈ GL(V). Then f ὔ is an invariant of H if and only if f( linear equations in n variables (entries of b). Any solution of this system produces an invariant of H.
Another possible way to attack the system is to find a matrix b ∈ GL(V) such that bHb − ⊂ G. This technique is related to the conjugacy problem for matrix groups and the graph isomorphism problem.
Variant two
In variant two of the cryptosystem, the group G, its representation in GL(V) and the invariant f are secret. However, Charlie can attempt to find an invariant f ὔ directly by choosing a possible degree d and solving linear systems derived from the equations unknowns that are the coefficients at monomials in f ὔ . Another approach is to find a matrix h ∈ H such that hu = v i for some i (attempting to recover the encryption done by Bob). This problem is related to the vector transporter problem and the graph isomorphism problem (see [11] ). Let us note that it was announced in [2] that the graph isomorphism problem can be solved in quasipolynomial time.
Cryptosystems over finite fields F
In this section, we discuss cryptosystems based in invariants of groups over finite fields F. We present concrete examples and show how the security of those cryptosystems is guaranteed assuming computational hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
Case n =
The case n = is singular. For simplicity, we assume the cardinality of the set M is .
Let F be the finite field GF(q) of characteristic p > and cardinality q = p r . In case n = , G is a subgroup of F × , the multiplicative group of F. If there is a nonconstant invariant f = p(x) of G that attains the constant value c when evaluated on each element of G, then G is a subset of the set of roots of the polynomial p(x) − c.
Furthermore, F is isomorphic to the splitting field of the polynomial x q − x = over the prime field GF(p). In particular, x q − x is an invariant of F and x q− is an invariant of F × attaining the value .
Since F × is cyclic, every subgroup G d of F × is also cyclic, generated by a q− d , given as a set of roots of x d − = for some d|(q − ). The set of invariants of G is generated by
of G separates v and v . Setting up the corresponding cryptosystem over the finite field F, we select g ∈ F that generates G and find an exponent d ὔ < q − such that g d ὔ = . For v , choose any element of G (i.e. v is a power of g). We also need to find an element v ∈ F that does not belong to G. Since we need not know the order d of g, the simplest way to guarantee this condition is to make sure that v
ὔ is an invariant of G separating v and v .
In order to break such a system, we need, for a given group G and vectors v and v , to find an invariant of G separating v and v . An invariant of G, namely the polynomial x q− , is known from the beginning but the problem is to find one that separates v and v .
If there is a algorithm that determines the order of any element g ∈ F in polynomial time, then the cryptosystem can be setup and broken in polynomial time, hence it is not secure. Even if there is no algorithm that determines the order of g in polynomial time, it may be possible to find a separating invariant and break the cryptosystem randomly.
Consider the following example.
where a is a primitive element of F × . Then the only invariant of G that separates v and v is x d . Therefore, breaking the cryptosystem is equivalent to finding the order of g, which is equivalent to finding of the prime factor s of q − . Hence, breaking a cryptosystem of this type is equivalent to finding the prime factorization of q − .
We give a brief review of the computational complexity of factorization of integers in the next subsection.
The value of the above example is in showing that even if an invariant of G is known, it might not be completely trivial to find an invariant separating v and v .
Another way to attack the system is try to find the exponent h such that g = a h . Then g is the primitive d = q− gcd(h,q− ) -th root of unity. Once we know the order d of g, we have found the invariant x d , separating v and v . Determining h in the above equation is the well-known discrete logarithm problem that is considered to be a difficult problem, which is, for instance, guarding the security of ElGamal cryptosystem [9] .
Nevertheless, we will not use the case n = to setup a cryptosystem due to concerns about its security. Only a partial information about the order d of g is required to break such a cryptosystem. Furthermore, it seems that to set up this cryptosystem is as difficult as it is to break it.
Computational complexity of the factorization of integers
We refer to [25] for the description of various algorithms and their complexity.
First we will overview the deterministic algorithms for factorization of integers.
One of the simplest is the Fermat algorithm that works best if n is a product of two factors that are of the same magnitude. The most popular deterministic algorithms for factorization of integers (all of them of exponential complexity) are (p − )-method, Pollard's ρ-method and the Pollard-Strassen algorithm. These algorithms are often used to find small prime factors. For more details and description of other algorithms, see [25, Chapter 2] .
When working over the finite field F = GF(q), where q = p r for a prime p, the following theorem helps to determine the factorization of q − . 
If p > and r is odd, then p ≡ (mod r) in the second case.
Although this statement seems easy to use, in reality due to condition (2) , it gives an algorithm of exponential complexity.
Probabilistic algorithms for factorization of an integer n with subexponential complexity are discussed in details in [25, Chapter 3] . The complexity of these algorithms is given by L n [γ, c], where γ = or and c is a positive constant,
and o( ) → as n → ∞. Most popular algorithms of this nature are Lenstra elliptic curve method, quadratic sieve and number field sieve. For more details on these, see [25, Chapters 3 and 4] .
n = and G cyclic
Next, we discuss the interesting case when G is cyclic and n = and we show that breaking the corresponding cryptosystem is equivalent to solving a discrete logarithm problem.
As above, F = FG(q) denotes a finite field of cardinality q, where q = p r and a be a primitive element of F × . Assume a cyclic group G is generated by the element γ = ( The following is a simple example of a cyclic group G for which finding an invariant f separating vectors from the given set M is computationally hard problem -see Proposition 3.4. Example 3.3. Assume that F = FG(q) is a finite field of cardinality q, where q = p r and s is a divisor of q − . Let α ∈ F × be an element of order s, and let β = α b for a secret integer b coprime to s. Let V = F , G ⊂ GL(V) be a cyclic group generated by the element g = ( α β ), and the set M consists of vectors v i = ( a i ), where a i = α i for exponents ≤ i < s that are coprime to s. Consider the cryptosystem based on this group G and the set M.
A general element of G, written as g x for some exponent x, acts on vectors v i as g x v i = (
The above setup is closely related to the ElGamal cryptosystem.
Discrete logarithm approach
Since Alice has chosen b when she designed the cryptosystem, she can use the rational invariant x −b x or polynomial invariant x b x q to decipher the message sent by Bob. Alternatively, she can decode a i and v i from ⃗ w simply by using a i = w /w b .
Charlie can break this cryptosystem if he has an effective algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem in G, namely to solve the equation α y = β for y. We now describe an algorithm that generates all invariants of the cyclic group G for n = . To start, we first find a primitive element a of F × and solve α = a l and β = a l for l and l . We note that finding a primitive element and solving discrete logarithm problems are computationally intensive. Afterward, to find a mono-
Invariant approach
Once l and l are known, there is an effective way to describe all solutions of the above congruence and all monomial invariants of G as follows. If gcd(l , q − ) = , then we can choose any d and com-
Here we find l − (mod q − ) using the Euclidean algorithm which runs
ὔ of the last congruence are described analogously as above since gcd(l ὔ ,
) . Once all invariants are known, it remains to select one that separates all elements of M.
Complexity and expansion in size
Coming back to Proposition 3.4, we have seen that even in the simplest case of n = and the group G being cyclic, the task of finding invariants of G separating elements of M is of the same complexity as the discrete logarithm problem.
Since the discrete logarithm assumption is weaker than the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, and that is weaker than decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, which are used in Diffie-Hellman key exchange and ElGamal encryption, we have a guarantee that the invariant-based cryptosystem of Example 3.3 is at least as secure as many standard and widely used public-key cryptosystems.
If we compare the cryptosystem from Example 3.3 to ElGamal public-key cryptosystem, we note that while ElGamal encryption produces a 2:1 expansion in size from plaintext (by this we mean a sequence of 0's and 1's) to ciphertext, the invariant-based cryptosystem from the above example produces log q: log s expansion in size from plaintext to ciphertext. If s is not small in comparison to q, say log s log q is close to 1, then this expansion will be close to 2:1. Also, the higher the number s becomes, more the ratio of expansion from the plaintext to the ciphertext improves.
In general, if s is small or if it is comparable to q, then finding the prime s would be easy. If q − = s s s , where s = s ̸ = s are two large primes and s is a small integer, then it could be challenging to determine the order s of the element α, since one needs to determine the prime factorization of q − . In this case the best choice would be if log s log q is close to . This implies that the corresponding expansion from plaintext to ciphertext will be close to 4:1 (one would hope that this is not a big price to pay for increasing the security of the cryptosystem).
In the case when n is general and the set M has the cardinality s, we get n log |F| : log s expansion. A trivial upper bound on the cardinality s of the set M is given by the index [F n : G]. Adjusting the previous example for n = we are able to get the expansion ratio close to n : -and quite possibly even better ratio with different choices of M. While such a ratio is a disadvantage, if we choose n small, this should not play a big role for the effectiveness of the cryptosystem.
Computational complexity of the discrete logarithm problem
Algorithms for computing discrete logarithms are the subject of [25, Chapter 5] . There one can find deterministic algorithms of exponential complexity and probabilistic algorithms of subexponential complexity. There is an algorithm for discrete logarithm problems in prime fields of complexity L q [ ; c]. ElGamal [8] gave an algorithm that works over Galois fields GF(q) and has the complexity L q [ ; c]. It is interesting that it uses a representation of GF(q) as the residue class ring Z/P, where Z is the ring of algebraic integers of the cyclotomic field ℚ(ζ p ), and P is a prime ideal of Z of the norm q.
Another algorithm working in prime fields is based on a number field sieve and has complexity L p [ ; c]. Finally, in [25, Section 5.6] there is an interesting algorithm for discrete logarithm with composite modulus based on Fermat quotients that works in residue class rings ℤ/mℤ with composite m.
Recently, Joux [15] found an algorithm for discrete logarithms of computational complexity L q [ ; o( )] for cases when the characteristic p of F is small in comparison to q. This allowed him to compute discrete logarithms in GF(
). This record was extended in [10] to GF( ).
G cyclic
When n > , the problem of finding monomial invariants of a cyclic group G over a finite field F separating elements of M is essentially reduced to multiple applications of the method already used to find invariants of cyclic G separating elements of M in the case n = .
Let F = FG(q) be a finite field of cardinality q, where q = p r , and let a be a primitive element of the multiplicative group F × . Let a cyclic group G be generated by an element
where γ j = a l j and ≤ l j < q − for j = , . . . , n and the set M consists of vectors
Since every invariant of G is a sum of monomial invariants, to obtain a complete description of all invariants of G we only need to find monomial invariants
In particular, x Proof. We will proceed by induction on n. The statement is trivial for n = . Assume that the statement is true for all l < n.
This together with
Replace the space F n by F n− , the group G with a group G ὔ generated by the matrix g ὔ obtained from the matrix g generating G by deleting its u-th row and column, and replace vectors ⃗ v k with ⃗ v ὔ k obtained by deleting the entry in their u-th row. By the above, the monomial
Using the inductive assumption, we get an invariant of 
G not cyclic
Noncyclic groups G exist for every n ≥ . We start with an example generalizing Example 3.3.
Example 3.6. Let F = FG(q), where q = p r , and s and s be (large) primes dividing q − . Let α ∈ F × be an element of order s and α ∈ F × be an element of order s , and a i be distinct elements of F × such that their order divides s s . Let G be given by two generators g = ( 
As before, we have chosen vectors ⃗ v i in such a way that none of the invariants of G of the form x e or x e would separate them. If there is an invariant of G separating vectors ⃗ v i , then we can assume that it is of the form
If a is the primitive element of F × , α = a a and α = a a for secret integers a and a , then this is equivalent to
for every x and x . This condition is equivalent to the system of congruences
These two congruences are related to different generators g and g of G. We have seen earlier that using discrete logarithms, we can describe all monomial invariants of the cyclic subgroups ⟨g ⟩ and ⟨g ⟩ of G. Of course, the invariants of G are exactly those polynomials that are invariants with respect to ⟨g ⟩ and ⟨g ⟩ simultaneously. The last two congruences can be solved by using integer linear programming because they are equivalent to the linear system 
If the numbers l ij are determined (say, using discrete logarithms), then the last system can be solved using integer programming since it is equivalent to the system We have seen that, for F a finite field, the fact that F × is cyclic allows the use of the discrete logarithm, which is computationally difficult but a standard cryptographic tool.
If G is cyclic, we could try to find any invariant of G randomly and check if it separates M. If G is not cyclic, then more systematic knowledge of invariants of cyclic subgroups of G is necessary, and the breaking of the cryptosystem based on noncyclic group G seems more complicated than the case of the cyclic group G. Additionally, it is not clear whether, for noncyclic group G, there exists a separating invariant based on two variables analogously to Proposition 3.5. Therefore, using noncyclic G appears to give an advantage from the point of view of security of the cryptosystem, based on invariants of G.
The setup will be even more complicated if the underlying structure of F is not cyclic. After we investigate the minimal degree of polynomial invariants (a concept related to a linear algebra attack on the cryptosystem) in the next section, we turn our attention to fields F of characteristic zero. We will introduce a cryptosystem, the security of which will depend on the factorization properties in the ring Z of integers of a number field F. Afterward, we will use residue classes of Z and replace F by a finite commutative ring R with a complicated multiplicative structure, which will not allow an obvious use of the discrete logarithms. In cases of the number field F, the nature of finding invariants of G is different from discrete logarithm problems. On the other hand, the multiplicative group of units of the residue ring R is usually not cyclic and its structure can be complicated.
Encryption based on discrete logarithm one-way functions
We would like to make a small detour from the invariant-based cryptosystems and discuss cryptosystems inspired by Examples 3.3 and 3.6 that are based on discrete logarithms.
Assume that Alice chooses a finitely generated group G acting on a set M. Let {g , . . . , g m } be a set of generators of G. Alice chooses a subset M ⊂ M such that every orbit Gm for m ∈ M intersects M in exactly one point. The set M will be bijectively mapped to the set of messages (or blocks of plaintext) that can be transmitted by Bob. Alice chooses a map f : M → M that is constant on each orbit Gm of G and retains it as a private key. Obviously f restricted on M is an identity. She announces, as a public key, the (effectively described) set M and the group G by announcing its generators g , . . . , g m .
To encode a block of plaintext m ∈ M , Bob chooses a random element g ∈ G (by multiplying some of the generators g , . . . , g m ), and computes m ὔ = gm which he transmits to Alice.
Alice decrypts the message by applying the map f as f(
Example 3.7. Consider the ElGamal cryptosystem with a cyclic group C of order n, generator α ∈ C, private key b ∈ { , . . . , n − } and the public key {α, β, n}, where β = α b . The group C will coincide with the set of all blocks of plaintext that can be sent by Bob to Alice. A cryptosystem is constructed as follows. Let M = C × C, considered as a group with respect to the multiplication induced by the diagonal action of C, and let G be its cyclic subgroup generated by (α, β) . Then G acts on M by multiplication. We set M = C and the map f : M → M to be f(x, y) = yx −b . Alice announces the group A and the vector (α , α , β) as a public key. To encode a block of plaintext m ∈ A, Bob chooses a random number e ∈ { , , . . . , n − } and transmits the vector This encryption produces a 3:1 expansion in size from plaintext to ciphertext. The security of this cryptosystem depends on the ability of the eavesdropper Charlie to solve the equation β = α x α x , for integers x and x . If we work over a finite field F = FG(q), then we can use the discrete logarithms in F × to express α , α and β as powers of the primitive element a of F × , say α i = a e i and β = a e . Then the equation β = α x α x reduces to a congruence e = e x + e x (mod q − ). Therefore, we require the discrete logarithm assumption to guard against this attack.
If would be interesting to show an explicit correlation of the complexity of breaking of the cryptosystems given by Examples 3.7 and 3.8 to the discrete logarithm problem.
Minimal degree of polynomial invariants of G
When we described the design of the cryptosystem based on invariants, we have already remarked that its security depends on the difficulty of finding an invariant f ὔ of the group H separating vectors in M.
When we are working over a ground field F of characteristic zero, then the condition that f ὔ separates v i and v j for i ̸ = j might not be difficult to satisfy because the set of polynomials in F [V] , that take on different values when evaluated at v i and v j , is open in the Zariski topology. Therefore, it is likely that a randomly chosen invariant f ὔ of H will separate elements of M in this case. Moreover, when F has characteristic zero, we need not be concerned whether f ὔ separates vectors from M. This is contrary to the situation over finite fields when it is easy to find an invariant of G but difficult to satisfy the condition that it separates elements of M.
Guarding against the linear algebra attack
Denote by M G,V , or simply by M G or M if we need not emphasize the group G or the vector space V it is acting on, the minimal positive degree of an invariant from
The notion of the minimal positive degree of an invariant and the value of M = M G,V are important for the security of the invariant-based cryptosystem (both variants one and two) we are considering. ) ) and the total search will take no more than time O(n r ). Therefore, for the security of the system it must be guaranteed that m n+M− M is not polynomial in n.
Finding a polynomial invariant of G
We will now discuss an algorithm that will enable us to find an invariant f ὔ of G (and to break the cryptosystem based on invariants of G if char F is zero). The algorithm works inductively and, as a special case, it works when G is a finite group. We will apply this algorithm when char F is zero but the algorithm works even when the characteristic of F is finite.
Assume that H is a subgroup of G of finite index in G. Assuming we know a nonzero invariant f of H, we will find a nonzero invariant of G. ).
Lemma 4.1. Let H be a subgroup of G of finite index s in G such that f is an invariant of H of degree t. Then the group G has a nonzero invariant of degree not exceeding sM H that can be found in time O(sn t+ n+t− t s+

Corollary 4.2. If G is a group of finite order s, then the algorithm in the proof of the previous lemma (applied to H = ) produces a nonzero invariant of G of order not exceeding s, which can be computed in time O(sn n s+ ).
Note that the time required to run the computation is exponential in the order of G if no invariant of a subgroup of G is known and when we attempt to find an invariant of G from H = . Nevertheless, there are cases when an invariant of H can be computed in polynomial time; see the next lemma. A field F is called formally real if there exists an ordering with respect to which F is an ordered field. The following lemma is well known, see [5] .
Lemma 4.3. Let G ⊂ GL n (F), where F is a formally real field. If G is finite, then G has an invariant of degree two.
Proof. Let g = , . . . , g s be a list of all elements of G and F[V] = F[t , . . . , t n ]. For each i = , . . . , s denote x i = g i (t + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + t n ). The value of the invariant polynomial ∑ s i= x i (considered as polynomial in t , . . . , t n ) equals zero only if each g i t j = (g i t j ) is zero. In this case we get t = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = t n = . Therefore ∑ s i= x i is a nonzero invariant of G.
It follows from the previous section that a quadratic invariant of the group H, within a context of our publickey cryptosystem, can be found using linear algebra techniques in the polynomial time in n. Therefore, for the security of the cryptosystem, we need to make sure that if H is finite, then it is not represented by matrices with real coefficients.
Lower bounds for degrees of polynomial invariants
The significance of understanding the minimal degree M G,V of invariants for the security of the invariantbased cryptosystem was established above. In particular, it is important to find a nontrivial lower bound for M G,V . Unfortunately, we are not aware of any articles establishing lower bounds for the minimal degree of invariants, except in very special circumstances, e.g. [13] .
On the other hand, there are numerous upper bounds for the minimal degree β
(G, V), such that F[V] G is generated as an algebra by all invariants in degrees not exceeding β(G, V). For example, a classical result of
Noether [21] states that if the characteristic of F is zero and G is finite of order |G|, then β(G, V) ≤ |G|. There is an extensive discussion of Noether bound and results about β(G, V) in Section 3 of [22] . It was conjectured by Kemper that for G ̸ = , and arbitrary ground field F, the number β(G, V) is at most dim V(|G| − ). Recently, this conjecture was proved by Symonds in [24] .
When one wants to find an invariant of G, it seems natural to consider an upper bound β(G, V). If, however, we want to show that there are no invariants of small degrees (as is our case), then we need to find lower bounds for M G,V . Until now, there was no real impetus to consider such a problem. We have investigated a minimal degree of invariants of G in general in [18] , where we have obtained its description for certain groups G.
Cryptosystems based on invariants of infinite diagonalizable groups
In this section, we assume that the characteristic of the ground field F is zero and we design and investigate the properties of a cryptosystem based on invariants of an infinite diagonalizable group. Let us fix an algebraic integer θ, a number field F = ℚ(θ) and the ring Z (containing the ring ℤ[θ]) of algebraic integers of F. Choose a finite set Q of integers of cardinality q and a set S m = {p , . . . , p m } of elements of Z. The elements p i of S m need not be primitive and could be units of Z. Denote by P m the set of all products of elements from the set S m .
Design of the cryptosystems
To start, Alice chooses sets Q and S m as above. Afterward, she chooses her secret key, which is the n-tuple of nonnegative integers (e , . . . , e n ), where one component, say e n , equals .
Then she constructs a set of generators t , . . . , t s of T in such a way that the monomial f = x e . . . n in such a way that the diagonal matrix
n as an invariant. Since she has chosen e n = , it is easy to see that the appropriate value of a
Once all generators t i of the group T are constructed, Alice chooses an invertible n × n matrix P as a part of her secret key and computes conjugates g i = Pt i P − . Alice then announces the diagonalizable group G given by its generators g i for i = , . . . , s.
When she receives the encrypted message, she can use her secret key P to switch from G to T and apply her previously chosen invariant f = x e . . . x e n n of T to decrypt the message, as explained in Section 2. She knows that f is an invariant of T because T was constructed to satisfy that condition.
To remove the randomness of the choice made during this process, Alice should use a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator.
How to break the cryptosystems in partial cases
We will explain how the above cryptosystem could be broken in the polynomial time for some rings Z.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that a ring Z is such that the group of units of Z is finite, Z is an Euclidean domain, and the Euclidean algorithm over Z runs in polynomial time in its input. If a vector, encrypted by the above cryptosystem, has no zero components, then it can be decrypted in polynomial time.
Proof. If the group of units of Z is finite, then it consists of roots of unity. Assume that it is generated by ζ E .
At first, we compute the characteristic polynomials of all matrices g i and find all of their eigenvalues. This can be done in polynomial time using the algorithm for factoring a polynomial over a number field described in [6, Section 3.6.2]. Hence, the factorization of all characteristic polynomials can be done in polynomial time in n. Then, we follow the algorithm explained in [14, n and their order with respect to fixed order of the eigenvectors. We will not work with the actual eigenvectors of V.
Since all eigenvalues are ratios of elements from Z, we can consider the set X of all elements from Z that appear in the numerators or denominators of any eigenvalue of any matrix t i . Using Euclidean algorithm, we can compute the set Y of all greatest common divisors of all pairs of elements from X. Then we can write a partial factorization of all elements of X in the form where x = yz and y is a product of elements from Y and Z is not divisible by any element from Y. Afterward, we replace X by a new set X ὔ consisting of all elements in Y and of elements z from the above factorization. In the next step we replace the set Y by the set Y ὔ consisting of all greatest common divisors of all pairs of elements from X ὔ . We continue in the same fashion and, after finitely many steps, this process will stabilize. Then we arrive at a set Y (d) of numbers that are pairwise coprime divisors of integers from X. Let us call elements of Y (d) atoms of X and denote them by {a , . . . a m ὔ }. Since the Euclidean algorithm in Z runs in polynomial time in n and there are no more than qm steps of the above process, we find the atoms in polynomial time in n.
For every atom a, every element x of X is either coprime to a, or is written as x = a l b, where b is coprime to a. Every a (i) j has the atom factorization
where ≤ e i,j < E. We can find an invariant of T from the structure of these diagonal matrices by solving, in nonnegative integers, the system of s equations The task to find a nonnegative integer solution of the linear system with integer coefficients is an NP-complete problem. If a solution of our system that has all nonnegative components is found, then it corresponds to a polynomial invariant of G.
Every integral solution, however, corresponds to a rational invariant, which is a rational function that is invariant under the G-action. If the intercepted encoded vector has no zero coordinates, then Charlie can use his rational invariants to decode the message.
Let us remark that the assumptions of the above lemma are satisfied for integers Z = ℤ or Gaussian integers Z = ℤ[i]. It is well known that the Euclidean algorithm runs in polynomial time over ℤ and ℤ[i]. For a survey of algorithmic results, see [1, Section 3] . Also, the above results can be extended further if we replace the assumption that Z is Euclidean domain by the assumption that Z is complex quadratic unique factorization domain. According to [16] there is an algorithm, running in polynomial time, that computes gcd in such rings Z.
Theory of divisibility and units in algebraic number fields
Assume that F is a number field, that is a finite extension of the field ℚ of rational numbers. Let Z be a ring of algebraic integers of F. In many rings Z factorization of elements into primes is not unique (hence Z are not unique factorization domains), see for example the case when
Recall the theory of divisibility developed by Kummer from [3, Section 3]. We replace an element a ∈ Z by the principal ideal (a) of Z generated by a. The ring Z is a Dedekind domain and it has a theory of divisors. In particular, each ideal a of Z can be written uniquely as a product a = p . . . In relation to factorization of elements from Z, it is important to recall the structure of the group U of units of Z. By the Dirichlet theorem, if r is the number of real embeddings of F and s is the number of complex embeddings of F, then the group U is isomorphic to a product of a finite group of roots of unity and a free group of rank r + s − , whose generators are called fundamental units of Z.
Security issue -The choice of the ring Z
The choice of the ring Z is perhaps the most critical since the security of the cryptosystem depends heavily on the arithmetic of the ring Z.
The atom or prime factorization analogous to the one considered in the proof of Lemma 5.1 is not available in suitable form for number fields in general. Let Z be the ring of algebraic integers of the field F = ℚ(θ). If Z is a principal ideal domain but not a Euclidean domain, then we have a factorization of every element of Z into a product of primitive elements and units of Z. Without the Euclidean algorithm, however, it is not clear if we can produce prime factorization of principal ideal in polynomial time. If Z is not a principal ideal domain, then instead of primitive elements we need to work with divisors. Namely, for each x ∈ Z there is the prime ideal decomposition (x) = p . . . p l , where p i are (not necessarily principal) ideals in Z. An ideal generated by each prime number p splits up to a product of many prime ideals (their number does not exceed the degree of the extension [F : ℚ], and this number is attained for totally ramified primes p). The problem of finding the prime ideal factorization in Z is very difficult. Its special case for F = ℚ is the prime factorization problem in ℤ. The difficulty of factoring a product of two large primes is the basis of the RSA public-key cryptosystem. We should consider only those rings Z for which their class number is bigger than one. Such a ring Z is not a unique factorization domain (and consequently not a principal ideal domain and not an Euclidean domain).
Even if we assume that the prime factorization of principal ideals generated by a (i) j is known, by itself it would not be enough to break the above system. The additional difficulty lies in the structure of the group of units of Z. For example, if we choose all elements of S m to be units of Z, then the whole idea of atom or prime decomposition is utterly useless. In order to facilitate the conversion into a system of linear equations, we would need to determine a factorization of each appearing unit into a product of roots of unity and fundamental units of the ring Z. Finding a set of fundamental units of the ring Z and decomposition of units of Z into products of root of unity and fundamental units, is by itself a very difficult problem and we are not aware of any algorithm solving these problems in polynomial time. Therefore, the break described in Lemma 5.1 cannot be duplicated for rings Z that are not unique factorization domains or those containing units of infinite orders. We remark that there is a plethora of examples of such rings Z appearing in the algebraic number theory.
A combination of obstacles related to factorization of principal ideals and factorization of units of Z as a product of fundamental units is the reason why we propose the above cryptosystem based on appropriately selected Z. We are unable to find a polynomial algorithm for finding an invariant of the corresponding diagonalizable group G.
To summarize, we need to choose the ring Z in such a way that it is not a unique factorization domain and preferably such that its class number is high. There are numerous examples of rings of integers of number fields that satisfy this condition. Secondly, we should choose Z so that the rank of its group of units is high. Using Dirichlet theorem, this condition is easy to satisfy.
Other security issues
We will consider other possible choices Alice can make and how they affect the security of the system. The additional choices that affect the security of the cryptosystem (besides the choice of Z) are the following.
The choice of the set S m
We could choose elements p i from the set S m in such a way that some of them are primitive. Also, we should choose them in such a way that their norms will have many common prime factors p. If we chose them randomly, then there is a great probability that the prime ideals dividing p in the prime decomposition of different p i are actually different. Also, we could choose some elements of S m to be units of Z in order to involve the structure of units of Z.
Choice of the set Q
A choice of a finite set Q does not seem to be important hence we can take it to be small, for example Q = {− , , }.
5.5.3
The choice of the secret key (e , . . . , e n )
Another important requirement we need to impose is that none of the entries (e , . . . , e n ) vanish. The reason for this is to guarantee that the invariant f we chose depends on all the variables x , . . . , x n . While we cannot guarantee that there are no invariants of G built on fewer than n variables, choosing our invariant f that depends on all variables is a reasonable precaution. When we increase the number of generators t i of T, it is more likely that T would not have invariants depending on a small number of variables. A more careful analysis of this relationship would be desirable.
In order to prevent linear algebra attacks described in Section 4.1, the secret key (e , . . . , e n ) must be chosen so that E = ∑ n i= e i is at least of the order of n. For example, she can choose e i ∈ { , } such that ∑ 
Choice of the exponents b
We would like to make sure that the minimal degree M T is close to E, which is the degree of f , or at least of the order n. If the number s of generators t is high, however, and all exponents b
k,j are chosen randomly, we expect that M T is going to be of order n. It is an interesting problem to investigate how to choose b
k,j to guarantee that M T is sufficiently large, say bigger than E/ .
If we cannot guarantee that M T is of order n, then we can add another generator diag(ζ E , . . . , ζ E ) to T. That would require replacing the field ℚ(θ) by ℚ(θ, ζ E ) and changing the ring Z.
This would give away to Charlie the degree of our invariant f , but it would also make sure that M T = E. Since E is of order n, this prevents the linear algebra break discussed in Section 4.1.
The choice of the transition matrix P
The idea of using conjugate group G instead of T is to make matrices representing elements g ∈ G as far away from the diagonal matrices as possible. Therefore, the matrix P should be complicated, and with many nonzero entries, in order to accomplish this. Please see part (b) of Section 5.6 about the security of conjugation by P.
Possible attacks
We will now describe possible attacks on the above cryptosystem.
(a) Linear algebra attack. Charlie might attempt to find an invariant of G directly using the linear algebra attack described in Section 4.1. The complexity of this approach is exponential in n if M G is of the order of n, which is likely going to be the case due to (random) choices of a (i) j and which can be guaranteed by adding another generator diag(ζ n , . . . , ζ n ) to T. Therefore, this linear algebra attack is ineffective.
(b) Finding the conjugate group T. Charlie might attempt to find a conjugate group T ὔ of G, consisting of diagonal matrices. In order to diagonalize G, he would find all eigenvalues of elements g j by computing their characteristic polynomials, which he can do in polynomial time in n. There exists a polynomial algorithm for factoring a polynomial over a number field -it is described in [6, Section 3.6.2] . Hence the factorization of all characteristic polynomials can be done in polynomial time in n. Once the eigenvalues of matrices corresponding to every g i are computed, he can simultaneously diagonalize all matrices g i (see [14, proof of Proposition 15.4] ) and obtain the generators of a group T ὔ , in polynomial time in n.
This suggests that the conjugation by P, suggested in [11] as a way of "hiding" the group G and its invariants, is not secure without our context.
(c) Finding an invariant using ideal and units factorization. For rings Z that are non-Euclidean or have infinite group of units, the attack described in Lemma 5.1 is not viable.
Possible modification of the system
We have seen before that switching from the system of equations On the other hand, for computational purposes we need to approximate the numbers a (i) j by complex numbers with finite decimal expansions. This would create difficulty estimating errors of the encryption process. For such a system it would be necessary to estimate possible error of encryption and also it would be necessary that the vectors v i from the set M used in the encryption process could be distinguishable within the errors of such computations.
More general systems considered in [12]
The main reason we were able to design a system for diagonalizable groups was that we were able to easily construct matrices that have a given monomial as its invariants. In the case of finite diagonalizable G, a reasonable description of the invariants for diagonal matrices is given in [18] . For infinite diagonalizable G the situation is similar but we have equations instead of congruences.
One could hope that designing a system based on nonabelian G would be more secure than that based on a diagonalizable group T, because it is more complicated to find invariants of such G than those of T. A system based on invariants of nonabelian group G would have an advantage that simultaneous diagonalization as described in Section 5.6 (b) is not possible. Therefore, the conjugation problem is more difficult to solve for nonabelian G. Also, we need to take into account that the minimal degree of G must be at least of order n to prevent linear algebra attacks.
In the paper [12] the authors have proposed a process of generating a more complicated (nonabelian) group G, its representation and a corresponding invariant starting from simpler groups using four types of operations. Their main idea was that it would be more difficult to find an invariant of G than that of the simpler groups. We will investigate how this construction affects the minimal degrees of invariants since they are important in regard to the possible linear algebra attack on the corresponding cryptosystem described in Section 4.1.
For the first operation, assume that G ≤ GL(V), where V ≃ R n is a free module over a ring R of rank n; and a ring homomorphism π : R → R ὔ , replacing R with a new ring R ὔ , are given. If R ὔ is a direct summand of R and π is a projection onto R ὔ (in which case R ὔ is called smaller), then every invariant of
The authors of [12] do not specify what they mean when R ὔ is larger, and we were unable to follow their arguments. If the kernel of the map π is nontrivial, however, then some of the invariants can be annihilated using this process and the minimal degree can potentially increase.
The second operation replaces G by a conjugated subgroup H = h − Gh for some h ∈ GL(V). Since the algebras/rings R[V] G and R [V] H are isomorphic, we have the equality of the minimal degrees M G,V = M H,V .
The third operation requires two groups G ≤ GL(V ) and G ≤ GL(V ), and replaces them by their direct product G × G embedded in a natural way into GL(V ⊕ V ). In this case the isomorphism The subgroup consisting of all elements with σ = is normal and it is isomorphic to the direct product G m and L is isomorphic to the semi-direct product
Summing up, all four operations as presented in [12] do not increase the minimal degrees of invariants of given representations of the initial groups (possibly with the exception of the first operation with noninjective map π). Therefore, regardless of how complicated the resulting group G and its representation is, it is no more secured against the linear algebra attack described in Section 4.1 and great care needs to be taken that the initial minimal degrees of the starting groups are large enough, say of the order n. On the other hand, if the minimal degrees of the starting group is sufficiently large, then from the point of view of such linear algebra attack it is not necessary to construct a more (structurally) complicated group or representation.
Invariants of supergroups
Another possible modification of the cryptosystem is obtained when the group G and its invariants are replaced by a supergroup and its superinvariants. A significant difference that is exhibited in this case is that invariants of supergroups do not have a basis consisting of monomials. Thus the structure of the invariants of supergroups is more complicated.
We will not go further into rather complicated details about supergroups and their invariants, but would like to refer an interested reader to the paper [18] where we have obtained results in this direction and stated potential application in cryptosystems, based on relative invariants and absolute invariants of supergroups.
Cryptosystem over finite rings R
In order to make the cryptosystem built in Section 5 more effective and easier to implement, we will make a modification that will work over finite rings R instead of over fields F.
Our motivating example is the residue class ring R of the ring Z of algebraic integers of a number field F modulo an ideal a of Z. We can, however, consider cryptosystem over arbitrary finite commutative ring R.
Structure theory for finite commutative rings R
Recall the following structure theorems for finite commutative, finite local commutative rings and their groups of units from [19] . Gilmer has characterized when R × is cyclic. The following theorem shows that in most cases R × is not cyclic. It might appear from the above proposition that, when we pass from the ring Z that is not a unique factorization domain (when its class number h > ), to the residue class ring R = Z/a, the bad properties of factorization in Z do not carry over to R since R is a principal ideal ring.
However, the complexity of the divisor theory of R, together with a choice of a, indeed influences the complexity of the structure of R. If the number r of primary factors p k i i and/or the exponents k i are high and the factorization of a is not available, it will be difficult to derive the structure of R effectively from the ring Z and its ideal a.
Determining the abstract structure of an arbitrary finite ring R seems to be an even more complicated problem.
Based on this discussion, we should choose the ring Z and its ideal a in such a way that the number r of primary components of a is high and the prime factorization p k . . . p r k r of a in Z is complicated.
Next, we will consider the special case when R = Z/(m) for the ring Z of algebraic integers of a number field F and integer m > . The choice of F and m cannot be independent, since even if Z has a complicated theory of divisors, choosing wrong m can create the residue ring R that is rather simple.
We will now modify previously defined cryptosystem based on invariants of diagonalizable groups to the case when R is the residue class ring R = Z/(m), where Z is the ring of algebraic integers of a number field F and m is an integer.
We start with Z that has complicated divisor theory and then look for appropriate m so that the structure of the residue ring R = Z/(m) reflects the complication of the factorization in Z and also problem of the factorization of the modulus m.
Let in Z. Let us consider the following cases for the choice of m.
(1) m is square-free. In particular, one appealing choice is when m is a product of two large primes p and p that do not ramify in F. In this case the ring R will be a direct sum of finite fields corresponding to residue class rings of Z by the prime divisors of m. We choose the prime factors of m to be unramified in F because otherwise it would be easier to factor m by considering the greatest common divisor of m and the discriminant of Z. A special case to consider is when either p , p or both are totally unramified.
If we want to involve local rings that are not finite fields in the decomposition of R, we have additional choices for m. We can choose m that ramifies in F or m that is not square-free, or a combination of both.
(2) m not square-free. For example, we can choose m = (p p ) , where both p and p are large primes. In this case we have the factorization problem for p p but since m is not square-free, it is much easier to find prime factorization of m when compared to the square-free case.
If we consider a more general case, and replace the integer m by an ideal a (principal or not) of Z such that a = p k . . . p 
Choice of the group G
Assume that we have already chosen Z, m and the corresponding complicated residue ring R = Z/(m). Let us modify the cryptosystem introduced in Section 5.1 in such a way that instead of working inside the ring Z, we will work inside the residue ring R = Z/(m).
We will assume that the entries in the diagonal matrices corresponding to generators g i of G are units of R. Assume that the group of units U of the ring R has a basis given by u , . . . , u r of respective orders o , . . . , o r ,
Conclusion
The breaking of the modified cryptosystem designed over R seems to require techniques going beyond discrete logarithm problems. More work is required to specify the parameters of the cryptosystem that provide its sought-after security and it is beyond the scope of this paper. We hope that we have convinced the reader that this is a worthwhile endeavor to undertake.
In the papers [11] and [12] the cryptosystem based on invariants of groups over a field F were considered. The above modification of our cryptosystem works over finite rings instead of fields. The main reason why we work over rings is because we want to use the matrix multiplication and conjugation by a matrix P to hide the group G as suggested by Grigoriev. If it is determined that the conjugation by P does not increase the security of the cryptosystem, then we can consider a more general setup and instead of working over finite rings we could work over finite groups or semigroups. For example, if G consists of diagonal matrices and we allow only monomial invariants, then it is enough to use multiplicative operation only. This outlines a possible direction for a future research.
